Yemen’s country-code domain .YE is delegated to TeleYemen (IANA root zone). Since the Houthi takeover of Sana’a, that infrastructure has been under militia control. .YE is used to project legitimacy, run propaganda, censor, and surveil Yemenis. Independent journalists have been kidnapped, disappeared, and killed; UN and NGO staff have been detained. We demand ICANN act.

The Problem: A Governance Failure

• Captured Registry: The .YE manager is TeleYemen (IANA record). Under Houthi control since they seized Sana’a (2014–2015), registry and telecom functions enable censorship and surveillance.
• Propaganda Fronts: saba.ye publishes Houthi “state” messaging; mmy.ye is the Houthi military media portal—both under .YE.
• Crimes Against the Press: Reporters and editors in Houthi areas have been abducted, sentenced, or killed; arrests spiked in 2025 (CPJ/RSF).
• Detention of UN/NGO Staff: At least 19 UN employees were recently detained; such raids have continued since 2024 (AP/HRW).
• Exclusion of a Nation: Legitimate institutions and civil society operate on .com/.net while .YE serves only a militia.

A Global Precedent, an ICANN Responsibility

Allowing armed groups to hold national TLDs normalizes digital state capture and undermines the credibility of the global DNS. There is precedent for redelegation after state collapse (e.g., .SO Somalia). ICANN should uphold its core principle that a ccTLD must serve the local Internet community.

ICANN would never allow a militia to run .fr or .uk. Silence on .YE is a double standard Yemenis pay for.

The Solution: Our Demand to ICANN

This is within ICANN’s mandate. We demand they:

1. Review the delegation of .YE based on failure to serve the local community.
2. Redelegate .YE to a neutral trustee until representative governance is restored.
3. Protect users by refusing to legitimize a ccTLD run by a militia that targets press and civil society.

Sources

• IANA root-zone record: .YE manager is TeleYemen – iana.org/domains/root/db/ye.html
• Houthi control of Sana’a & north Yemen (2014–2016) – wilsoncenter.org
• Saba News Agency (.YE, Houthi site) – saba.ye/en; alt gov SABA – sabanew.net
• Military media portal mmy.ye – mmy.ye; listed on Yemeni Armed Forces page – wikipedia.org
• Press arrests/abductions (2025) – CPJ: cpj.org; RSF: rsf.org
• UN staff detentions – AP: apnews.com; HRW: hrw.org
• Internet blocking & censorship in Yemen – article19.org
• Telecom/TeleYemen control enabling surveillance – counterextremism.com